Haiti’s Political and Security Imbroglio: Where Are We?
As Kenya is preparing to lead a multinational intervention to help struggling Haiti, this piece highlights how we got there, what is possible, and what to watch in the next few months.
Background
Moise’s death and Henry’s emergence
Despite many years of governance assistance from the international community and peacekeeping missions, Haiti has remained largely unstable, and whose governance can be seriously challenged by any group with a minimum destabilizing capacity. In fact, the Caribbean nation has never been so close to the brink of collapse as in the past few years. Haiti last held elections in 2016, when Jovenel Moise, a political newbie, and protégé of ex-President Martelly, won the election. The victor of a highly contested election, Moise’s mandate was further stained by a string of allegations of wrongdoing, such as corruption, ties with gangs, and growing authoritarian behavior. His presidency also coincided with a declining influx of foreign assistance, a plunging economy, and national anti-corruption protests. On July 7th, 2021, Moise was assassinated at his home in conditions and for reasons that remain mysterious to the grand public. Two days before his killing, he nominated Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon, to replace Claude Joseph as Haiti’s prime minister. A short-lived power struggle between Joseph and Henry for Haiti’s leadership saw the latter emerge as the winner with the blessings of Washington.
Montana
Stemming from protests during Moise’s era, civil society actors, politicians, and members of the economic class, with nearly 1,000 signatories, established the Citizen Conference for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (known as the Montana Group). The group includes members like Fritz Jean, a former governor of Haiti’s central bank, former parliament member Steven Benoit, and other prominent political and social groups. On August 30th, 2021, the group signed the “Montana Accord,” proposing a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister chosen by a National Council of Transition (CNT). The transitional government would work alongside an oversight committee and an implementation monitoring office to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human rights violations. Montana received broad support from local actors, diaspora groups, and policy experts, and became popular in the international community, including the U.S. However, the group has not been able to implement its plan, particularly due to its inability to reach a consensus with Mr. Henry.
Deteriorating conditions, US-Canada sanctions, December 21 agreement
As the political standoff persists, the security and economic situation in Haiti has also significantly worsened. Gangs have controlled over 80% of Haiti’s capital, blocked major roads and impeded the circulation of people and goods, and occasionally sieged key state infrastructures. In response, Henry requested an international military intervention in October 2022 to help reestablish control and enable humanitarian aid deliveries. His demand was met with large opposition from many Haitian civil society groups and ambiguous responses from the international community. However, some key groups from Haiti’s private sector, ordinary citizens, and some members of the international community, to varying degrees, support the deployment of an international security force to Haiti.
As gangs continue to wreak havoc across Haiti and Henry’s government's laissez-faire attitude vis-à-vis the abusers, the United States and Canada opted for sanctions in an attempt to cut the gangs’ finances. Together, Canada and the United States have imposed sanctions on over 30 current and former Haitian officials and businessmen. The U.S. State Department has also denied visas to dozens of others and their immediate families. The list includes former presidents, prime ministers, members of parliament, and affluent families.
In response to the international community’s request for a broad political consensus, Henry’s government and some political and societal actors signed the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections(December 21 agreement). The agreement vowed to keep Mr. Henry as Haiti’s sole leader and proposed a three-member High Council of Transition (HCT) with an advisory role to the prime minister and an oversight committee. The accord received very limited support from civil society and Haitian diaspora groups but is popular among economic groups in Haiti. The international community also endorsed the agreement, though lamenting its lack of inclusiveness. Seven months later, the signatories have only managed to establish the HCT, whose inaction leaves many observers in a fog and begins to lose credibility even among its initial supporters.
Kenya to lead a non-UN multinational force in Haiti
Besides imposing sanctions, the U.S. has been struggling to find a country to lead the requested multinational security force. The Biden Administration has been pressuring partners, primarily Canada for whom increasing support for Haiti’s National Police has been the main focus, to take the lead. Jamaica and a few other African countries were also consulted, but they all refused to play the role until Kenya decided to step up to the plate. On July 30th, 2023, Kenya’s Minister of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs announced that his country “has accepted to positively consider leading a Multi-National Force to Haiti,” consistent with the country’s commitment to helping nations of African heritage. Since the announcement, several countries have pledged to support the mission by providing personnel while the U.S. and Canada publicly committed to finding the resources, including about $200-$400 million a year, logistical, and technical support.
My take
Finding the right balance between supporting and opposing the international military force
Addressing the security issue in Haiti is more complex than what policy experts are willing to accept and discuss publicly. Just like the general situation in Haiti is complex, the security issue is also multilayered. The interrelated links between businesspeople, politicians, and the gangs in Haiti and how international traffickers use the country’s deficiencies to smuggle guns and other substances are well documented. A multinational force without mechanisms to investigate and cut the links between gangs and their enablers while strengthening Haiti’s borders can only allow a truce in the current atrocities. Therefore, proponents must refrain from overselling the mission and what it will accomplish for the Haitian people.
On the other hand, the Haitian National Police (HNP), for many noticeable as well as inconspicuous reasons, has not been able to bring relief to the people. Several Haitian and international security experts concurred that the HNP is ill-equipped, ill-trained, and requires considerable vetting, including at the leadership level. Additionally, the losses sustained over the past years have severely damaged the morale of officers, leading to massive abandonment of posts. Consequently, we cannot rely only on the police in its current condition to resolve the security issue, and supporting security assistance to the HNP, to the population, is of utmost importance and an act of pragmatism.
Sending a multinational force to Haiti must not be a substitute for an inclusive political agreement
The level of cruelty the gangs have been able to exert on the population epitomizes the failure of Haiti’s government. Unfortunately, the prime minister does not seem to be too concerned as he admitted in an interview with The New Yorker explaining that he has nothing planned to address the insecurity. He also stated that “Haitians are very resourceful, maybe they will invent something.” Given their lack of urgency in addressing the security situation, it would be a mistake to assume the government members have any interest in cooperating over a political consensus, which is synonymous with losing relevance.
If the international community really wants to help Haiti, it must also commit to helping Haitian stakeholders reach an accord on the governance aspect in addition to security assistance. The presence of a multinational force in Haiti must not be at the expense of a real political consensus, especially not to reinforce the current government. So far, the international community’s unconditional backing of Mr. Henry since 2021 has proven to be a major impediment to a political accord. Luckily, the Montana and December 21 accords have many similarities. Building on the similarities may involve a reorganized, inclusive, and more powerful HCT, for example, which could be decisive to unlock the situation.
What to Watch
The reactions of Haitian and Kenyan civil societies
Shortly after the announcement of Kenya’s Minister of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs that his country is “positively considering leading a multinational force in Haiti,” many Haitians began to pay attention to the situation inside Kenya. The truth is, that the findings do not suggest much optimism. Kenya is facing serious security threats from terrorist groups from neighboring countries. Many Kenyans reacted with stupefaction to the announcement on Twitter due to Kenyan forces’ inability to successfully curb insecurity at home. Moreover, a 2022 State Department report outlined how Kenyan forces used abusive power and violated human rights in dealing with their own population. The fate of the potential mission in Haiti will not depend on the issues mentioned above; however, they will not help should things begin to go south once on the ground. In Haiti, the resistance will mostly come first from mostly internal special groups, but for the population who is left alone and being fired at by both gangs and the police itself, any help will be welcome.
The UN Security Council’s vote on the to-be-introduced resolution to authorize the mission
A spokesperson for the State Department stated that the US will do everything possible to support the multinational security mission to Haiti, including providing money and logistics. The U.S. official also said that his country and Ecuador will submit a resolution to the UN soon to seek the organization’s authorization for the mission. It will be important to watch the vote since its outcome will determine whether the deployment will be a UN or a non-UN mission, which will then determine factors such as level of engagement and possible duration. The tandem China-Russia has constantly challenged U.S.’ approach to the issues in Haiti, something we can arguably factor in a broader perspective, yet it warrants attention because the nature of the force might also depend on those two countries.
The reactions of the gangs in Haiti
The contours of the security mission, duration, and specifics are yet to be announced. If the international community, especially Canada, has constantly emphasized the importance of empowering the police, bringing the gangs to heel will also be a main target. When Canada and the United States began imposing sanctions on Haitian politicians and oligarchs, many believed violence in the streets would decrease. Though we witnessed sporadic pauses, it is difficult to attribute them to the sanctions. Now that Kenya has agreed to offer a critical missing piece in the intervention puzzle, it is important to watch how the gangs will react. Will they intensify their onslaughts on the population in the meantime? Will they retreat? Will they engage in retaliation during future operations? The signals sent by the Kenyans or the national police with the mission’s backup will undoubtedly dictate the gangs’ response and strategies.
The CARICOM’s Eminent Persons Group role amid this new development
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has been the latest actor to actively engage in attempting to broker a deal between Haitian stakeholders. Following the 2023 Heads of Government conference, a CARICOM special mission went to Haiti for a one-day working visit in February. After the visit, the organization appointed an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to initiate and oversee dialogues between Haitians and facilitate international cooperation. The EPG convened Haitian actors in Jamaica for a three-day conference. The discussions did not bear fruit, but the actors pledged to remain in negotiations to reduce their differences. The EPG traveled to Haiti in July, for a three-day follow-up mission, but the results seemed even less pleasant than in Kingston. As the international community is focused on military intervention, the de facto government and its allies will be even less likely to facilitate the EPG’s task. As the entity that has gotten closer to helping stakeholders reach a deal, it will be important to watch its role amid these developments as it may be an indicator of progress on the political front.